Some Interesting Analysis From China
I don't know how real or true this is, and my Chinese language skills - in a word, nonexistent - aren't useful in tracing the provenance or authenticity of this article, but it's interesting...
“The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most severe geopolitical conflict since World War II and will result in far greater global consequences than September 11 attacks. At this critical moment, China needs to accurately analyze and assess the direction of the war and its potential impact on the international landscape. At the same time, in order to strive for a relatively favorable external environment, China needs to respond flexibly and make strategic choices that conform to its long-term interests.
Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine has caused great controvsery in China, with its supporters and opponents being divided into two implacably opposing sides. This article does not represent any party and, for the judgment and reference of the highest decision-making level in China, this article conducts an objective analysis on the possible war consequences along with their corresponding countermeasure options.
I. Predicting the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War
1. Vladimir Putin may be unable to achieve his expected goals, which puts Russia in a tight spot. The purpose of Putin’s attack was to completely solve the Ukrainian problem and divert attention from Russia’s domestic crisis by defeating Ukraine with a blitzkrieg, replacing its leadership, and cultivating a pro-Russian government. However, the blitzkrieg failed, and Russia is unable to support a protracted war and its associated high costs. Launching a nuclear war would put Russia on the opposite side of the whole world and is therefore unwinnable. The situations both at home and abroad are also increasingly unfavorable. Even if the Russian army were to occupy Ukraine’s capital Kyiv and set up a puppet government at a high cost, this would not mean final victory. At this point, Putin’s best option is to end the war decently through peace talks, which requires Ukraine to make substantial concessions. However, what is not attainable on the battlefield is also difficult to obtain at the negotiating table. In any case, this military action constitutes an irreversible mistake.
2. The conflict may escalate further, and the West’s eventual involvement in the war cannot be ruled out. While the escalation of the war would be costly, there is a high probability that Putin will not give up easily given his character and power. The Russo-Ukrainian war may escalate beyond the scope and region of Ukraine, and may even include the possibility of a nuclear strike. Once this happens, the U.S. and Europe cannot stay aloof from the conflict, thus triggering a world war or even a nuclear war. The result would be a catastrophe for humanity and a showdown between the United States and Russia. This final confrontation, given that Russia’s military power is no match for NATO’s, would be even worse for Putin.
3. Even if Russia manages to seize Ukraine in a desperate gamble, it is still a political hot potato. Russia would thereafter carry a heavy burden and become overwhelmed. Under such circumstances, no matter whether Volodymyr Zelensky is alive or not, Ukraine will most likely set up a government-in-exile to confront Russia in the long term. Russia will be subject both to Western sanctions and rebellion within the territory of Ukraine. The battle lines will be drawn very long. The domestic economy will be unsustainable and will eventually be dragged down. This period will not exceed a few years.
4. The political situation in Russia may change or be disintegrated at the hands of the West. After Putin’s blitzkrieg failed, the hope of Russia’s victory is slim and Western sanctions have reached an unprecedented degree. As people’s livelihoods are severely affected and as anti-war and anti-Putin forces gather, the possibility of a political mutiny in Russia cannot be ruled out. With Russia’s economy on the verge of collapse, it would be difficult for Putin to prop up the perilous situation even without the loss of the Russo-Ukrainian war. If Putin were to be ousted from power due to civil strife, coup d’état, or another reason, Russia would be even less likely to confront the West. It would surely succumb to the West, or even be further dismembered, and Russia’s status as a great power would come to an end.
II. Analysis of the Impact of Russo-Ukrainian war On International Landscape
1. The United States would regain leadership in the Western world, and the West would become more united. At present, public opinion believes that the Ukrainian war signifies a complete collapse of U.S. hegemony, but the war would in fact bring France and Germany, both of which wanted to break away from the U.S., back into the NATO defense framework, destroying Europe’s dream to achieve independent diplomacy and self-defense. Germany would greatly increase its military budget; Switzerland, Sweden, and other countries would abandon their neutrality. With Nord Stream 2 put on hold indefinitely, Europe’s reliance on US natural gas will inevitably increase. The US and Europe would form a closer community of shared future, and American leadership in the Western world will rebound.
2. The “Iron Curtain” would fall again not only from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, but also to the final confrontation between the Western-dominated camp and its competitors. The West will draw the line between democracies and authoritarian states, defining the divide with Russia as a struggle between democracy and dictatorship. The new Iron Curtain will no longer be drawn between the two camps of socialism and capitalism, nor will it be confined to the Cold War. It will be a life-and-death battle between those for and against Western democracy. The unity of the Western world under the Iron Curtain will have a siphon effect on other countries: the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy will be consolidated, and other countries like Japan will stick even closer to the U.S., which will form an unprecedentedly broad democratic united front.
3. The power of the West will grow significantly, NATO will continue to expand, and U.S. influence in the non-Western world will increase. After the Russo-Ukrainian War, no matter how Russia achieves its political transformation, it will greatly weaken the anti-Western forces in the world. The scene after the 1991 Soviet and Eastern upheavals may repeat itself: theories on “the end of ideology” may reappear, the resurgence of the third wave of democratization will lose momentum, and more third world countries will embrace the West. The West will possess more “hegemony” both in terms of military power and in terms of values and institutions, its hard power and soft power will reach new heights.
4. China will become more isolated under the established framework. For the above reasons, if China does not take proactive measures to respond, it will encounter further containment from the US and the West. Once Putin falls, the U.S. will no longer face two strategic competitors but only have to lock China in strategic containment. Europe will further cut itself off from China; Japan will become the anti-China vanguard; South Korea will further fall to the U.S.; Taiwan will join the anti-China chorus, and the rest of the world will have to choose sides under herd mentality. China will not only be militarily encircled by the U.S., NATO, the QUAD, and AUKUS, but also be challenged by Western values and systems.
III. China’s Strategic Choice
1. China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as possible. In the sense that an escalation of conflict between Russia and the West helps divert U.S. attention from China, China should rejoice with and even support Putin, but only if Russia does not fall. Being in the same boat with Putin will impact China should he lose power. Unless Putin can secure victory with China’s backing, a prospect which looks bleak at the moment, China does not have the clout to back Russia. The law of international politics says that there are “no eternal allies nor perpetual enemies,” but “our interests are eternal and perpetual.” Under current international circumstances, China can only proceed by safeguarding its own best interests, choosing the lesser of two evils, and unloading the burden of Russia as soon as possible. At present, it is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks before China loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively.
2. China should avoid playing both sides in the same boat, give up being neutral, and choose the mainstream position in the world. At present, China has tried not to offend either side and walked a middle ground in its international statements and choices, including abstaining from the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly votes. However, this position does not meet Russia’s needs, and it has infuriated Ukraine and its supporters as well as sympathizers, putting China on the wrong side of much of the world. In some cases, apparent neutrality is a sensible choice, but it does not apply to this war, where China has nothing to gain. Given that China has always advocated respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it can avoid further isolation only by standing with the majority of the countries in the world. This position is also conducive to the settlement of the Taiwan issue.
3. China should achieve the greatest possible strategic breakthrough and not be further isolated by the West. Cutting off from Putin and giving up neutrality will help build China’s international image and ease its relations with the U.S. and the West. Though difficult and requiring great wisdom, it is the best option for the future. The view that a geopolitical tussle in Europe triggered by the war in Ukraine will significantly delay the U.S. strategic shift from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region cannot be treated with excessive optimism. There are already voices in the U.S. that Europe is important, but China is more so, and the primary goal of the U.S. is to contain China from becoming the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region. Under such circumstances, China’s top priority is to make appropriate strategic adjustments accordingly, to change the hostile American attitudes towards China, and to save itself from isolation. The bottom line is to prevent the U.S. and the West from imposing joint sanctions on China.
4. China should prevent the outbreak of world wars and nuclear wars and make irreplaceable contributions to world peace. As Putin has explicitly requested Russia’s strategic deterrent forces to enter a state of special combat readiness, the Russo-Ukrainian war may spiral out of control. A just cause attracts much support; an unjust one finds little. If Russia instigates a world war or even a nuclear war, it will surely risk the world’s turmoil. To demonstrate China’s role as a responsible major power, China not only cannot stand with Putin, but also should take concrete actions to prevent Putin’s possible adventures. China is the only country in the world with this capability, and it must give full play to this unique advantage. Putin’s departure from China’s support will most likely end the war, or at least not dare to escalate the war. As a result, China will surely win widespread international praise for maintaining world peace, which may help China prevent isolation but also find an opportunity to improve its relations with the United States and the West.” https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/12/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice/ original in Chinese here: http://uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=27365
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”Update on March 13, 2022: The [above] article was submitted by the author to the Chinese-language edition of the US-China Perception Monitor. The article was not commissioned by the US-China Perception Monitor, nor is the author affiliated with the Carter Center or the US-China Perception Monitor.
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Hu Wei is the vice-chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the Counselor’s Office of the State Council, the chairman of Shanghai Public Policy Research Association, the chairman of the Academic Committee of the Chahar Institute, a professor, and a doctoral supervisor. To read more by Hu, click here to read his article on “How did Deng Xiaoping coordinate domestic and international affairs?”
Written on March 5, 2022. Translated by Jiaqi Liu on March 12, 2022.”
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”The U.S.-China Perception Monitor (中美印象) is an online publication that explores perception and misperception in U.S.-China relations through insightful commentaries, interviews with experts, and profiles on key figures in the bilateral relationship. The website is a not-for-profit operated by the China Focus of the Carter Center, a nongovernmental organization that has improved life for people in more than 80 countries by resolving conflicts, advancing democracy and human rights, preventing disease, and improving mental health care.
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President Carter’s decision to normalize the relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China in 1979 changed China, the United States, and the world. The Carter Center is dedicated to preserving this legacy and advancing U.S.-China relations by building synergy between China and the United States, fostering greater cooperation between them and other nations, and helping to shape the critical U.S.-China bilateral relationship through workshops, websites, and scholarly publications.
Our Commitment
While the Center pursues its own organizational priorities, the U.S.-China Perception Monitor maintains editorial independence. We invite a range of American and Chinese experts, journalists, and students to write for the website to better understand how developments in the bilateral relationship are interpreted and perceived among different actors and special interest groups. Our content does not necessarily reflect the views of the Carter Center.” https://uscnpm.org/about-us/
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The Hu Wei article has apparently been censored in China, and has been followed up by this critique:
”To Readers, and Review of Professor Hu Wei's "Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China's Choices”
Dr. Chen - Echoes of Thucydides 2022-03-12 20:02
Yesterday, I reposted Mr. Hu Wei's article, which triggered extensive discussion. When it exceeded 40,000 readers and nearly 400 comments, it triggered WeChat's "meltdown" mechanism. Later, I saw that other public numbers had also republished the article and had 100,000+ readers, so I knew the reason was the readers' messages (after writing this article, I found that all the messages posted on the numbers had been deleted).
Due to the limitation of the number of selected messages, I have to have some choice, is relatively rational on the matter, both for and against, but the majority of opponents (and many personal attacks, words are too hard to hear). Mr. Hu also read the readers' comments, and the force against "cutting with Russia" was more than he expected. After some hesitation, I'd like to take this opportunity to say a few words.
The company's main business is to provide a wide range of products and services to the market. I do research in the market, which is a main line of understanding market fluctuations, so you must pay close attention. Considering the sensitivity of the topic, I have also opened this shadow number to be the first to share documents, reports or articles in the field of US-China relations. (The number of followers of this number is smaller, but the open rate, clicks and dissemination are stronger, perhaps because the articles cannot be read unless they are read in time! I would also like to thank readers for their support.)
Where to start? Long training in economics has guided the author to understand some phenomena from a micro basis, that is, human behavior. So, we chose to start with Trump and his staff team. We collected almost all the materials we could find in the English-speaking world, and systematically sorted out the U.S. policy toward China, centering on people and extending the functions of their departments. Each staffer and department wrote 20-30,000-word in-depth features on China policy. The market generally writes about people in a slapdash manner and narratives in a heavy-handed manner. We wrote in the opposite way, but it left some impression on some of our peers' predecessors. Later, and for well-known reasons, the author shifted the focus to U.S. politics and economic issues.
Also because of the Sino-US relationship issue, in a WeChat group, Mr. Hu added my WeChat. Mr. Hu often writes insider articles, which also allows our team to express some views on the issue of China-US relations.
Readers who have been following U.S.-China relations on an ongoing basis may also have experienced that since Biden took office, China's external situation has not gotten better, but trickier. During Trump's tenure, it was difficult for the U.S. to "encircle" China, using bilateral principles as a guide, and instead promoting the China-EU CIA and RCEP negotiations. But with Biden in office, the China-EU CIA was put on hold. Coupled with the epidemic of recent years, the external environment is very unpromising.
I think there is a consensus on why the Russia-Ukraine war broke out. After the Cold War, the evolution of Russia's geostrategy has been described by the author in this article: A Comprehensive Interpretation of the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict (15,000 words), so I will not repeat it.
Back to Mr. Hu's article. After it was forwarded, the number of readers rose rapidly and the comments section was very lively. I then asked Mr. Hu if I should delete it, worrying that it might bring him unnecessary trouble. Because, due to Mr. Hu's special status, the article would most likely reach relevant countries and departments overseas (because I often read some documents from the U.S. government or important think tanks, and they very much like to quote Chinese media, especially representative media or individuals). What's more, the views in the article are very unpleasant, neither in line with the mainstream domestic public opinion, nor possibly with the top-level design. To put it in a bigger way, it may also have some side effects on the diplomatic level. I can think of everything that Mr. Hu should have considered. But Mr. Hu still resisted the pressure to let the article go viral. This article was originally intended as an internal reference, but ......
I can appreciate Mr. Hu's helplessness. At this time, on this issue, the shimmer of reason are valuable. A different position is inherently valuable. Hu Wei teacher said: I do not speak or no one to speak, how to do? Many messages, said those hard words, let people sigh.
Here I also want to express my personal views. I understand the thinking of "cutting with Russia" proposed by Mr. Hu Wei, but I do not fully agree. First, the game is dynamic, in the international arena, the West is still firmly in control of public opinion, the implementation of this strategy, may not achieve the desired results, the situation may be more embarrassing.
Second, it can no longer be expected that China and the United States can still go back to the old days because of the same position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. All countries (or regions) that respond with sanctions have "private goods" and want the fire to burn brighter and their interests to be highlighted. China's choice is indeed crucial, as Mr. Hu said, for the future of the country. Unlike Mr. Hu, I think the key is to see if China's response can be exchanged for a change in Europe's attitude toward China. In comparison, China-Europe relations are more important than China-Russia relations.
Unlike the United Kingdom, the EU is not a piece of iron, not with the United States a nostril out of breath. This conflict, the European Union with the mirror, you are the United States is a good thing to get a good deal. Although the EU is very uncomfortable, but politicians and strategists are very pragmatic, can take the opportunity to do something, perhaps in the promotion of integration can do something, such as financial integration. Some countries, such as Germany and Poland, can also use this opportunity to increase military spending. So, China has common interests with Europe. I am more in favor of joint mediation of the war with the EU (especially Germany and France) than cutting with Russia, and the more aggressive the better and the sooner the better.
In a sense, the Russia-Ukraine conflict provides an opportunity for "creative transformation" of China-EU relations.
There are still some misconceptions about Europe, I think. In "A Farewell to Hegemony," Reich and Lebow elaborate on Europe's agenda-setting, quoting a passage from the American neoconservative Kagan.
"Stop pretending that Europeans share a common worldview with Americans, or that they share the same world. When it comes to answering questions about power, such as the efficacy, morality and claims of power, the American and European perspectives are distinct. Europe is moving away from power. Or rather, Europe is approaching power a little differently, moving beyond it into an autonomous world of law, regulation, transnational negotiation and cooperation. Europe is moving into a "post-historical" paradise of peace and relative prosperity, where, as Kant said, "Perpetual Peace" becomes a reality. At the same time, the United States is mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic "Hobbesian" world where international law and rules cannot be relied upon, and where the promotion of true security, defense, and liberal order depends on the possession and use of military force... ...they rarely agree and understand each other less and less ...... When it comes to setting national priority agendas,exactly how to identify threats, define challenges, and shape and implement foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have gone their separate ways."“
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/WCcXCEGZdsqL30VvZ1MCaA translated from Chinese by DeepL translator…
and since I don’t know enough Chinese to fix the odd parts, i.e. “EU is not a piece of iron, not with the United States a nostril out of breath”, I’m just going to let them stand as is, the rest is pretty understandable. It’s pretty controversial, Hu Wei doesn’t appear to have the official position he claims - he’s not listed at
http://english.counsellor.gov.cn/ - but he does appear to have enough of a position somewhere to create the furore he has created as witness the above critique.
Andrew Korybko has a relevant article up. FYI... https://oneworld.press/?module=articles&action=view&id=2586