The Greater Eurasian Plan For The Partition Of Ukraine - This Laid Out, 25 Years Ago, What Putin Is Attempting Now
Having read this, it's plainly clear that the policy choices of Aleksandr Dugin are Putin's playbook, it shows his present and future intent - from the real FoG, not the sanitized 4th Political Theory
“The further existence of a unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several zones, corresponding to the gamut of geopolitical and ethnocultural realities.
1) Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper from Chernigov to the Sea of Azov) is a compactly populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and the Orthodox Little Russian population. This entire territory is undoubtedly close to Russia, culturally, historically, ethnically and religiously connected with it. This well-developed, technically advanced region may well constitute an independent geopolitical region, with broad autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridian integration is preferable, the connection of the Kharkov region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) of the Russian territories proper and the spread of the structure to the south.
2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity, traditionally characterized by ethnic mosaicism. Little Russians, Great Russians and Crimean Tatars settled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and represent three geopolitical impulses that are quite hostile to each other. The Great Russians are oriented emphatically pro-Moscow (more aggressively than the rest of Ukraine, even Eastern). Little Russians, on the contrary, are extremely nationalistic. In general, Crimean Tatars are oriented more towards Turkey and are rather hostile to Russia. Taking into account the geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars is out of the question, since Turkey is in all respects a direct geopolitical adversary of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be ignored either. Direct annexation of Crimea to Russia will cause an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and create problems of integrating this peninsula into the Russian system through the Ukrainian territories, which is hardly realistic at all. Leaving Crimea to "sovereign Ukraine" is also impossible, since this creates a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical security and generates ethnic tension in Crimea itself. Taking into account all these considerations, the conclusion suggests itself that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy with direct strategic control of Moscow, but with taking into account the socio-economic interests of Ukraine and the ethnocultural requirements of the Crimean Tatars.
3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernigov to Odessa, where Kiev also falls, is another complete region, where the Little Russian ethnos and language dominate ethnically, but Orthodoxy is the predominant confession. This Orthodox Little Russia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally related to Eastern Ukraine and certainly part of the Eurasian geopolitical system.
4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the North it is Volyn, a separate region, south of the Lviv region (Galicia), even south of Transcarpathia (western ledge), and finally, the eastern part of Bessarabia. All of these regions are fairly independent areas. Volyn is dominated by Uniates and Catholics; this region culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. The picture is almost the same in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southerly lands represent a separate geopolitical reality. Volyn is historically connected with Poland, and Galicia and Transcarpathia with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are inhabited by a mixed population, where Little Russians and Great Russians are interspersed with Romanians and Moldovans. This region is almost entirely Orthodox and is an Orthodox belt, obliquely leaving from Great Russia Bessarabia to Odessa follows geopolitical space, to the Balkans to Attributed to so his Serbia. The entire sector from the Central Ukrainian it would be more logical to include in the meridian left-bank belt of the Dnieper, the western border of which stretches from Rivne to Ivano-Frankivsk along the North-South axis and further along the Dniester to Odessa in the south. Thus, Western Ukraine, in the narrow sense of this concept, consists of three regions of Volyn and Galicia and Transcarpathia. Being geographically close, they differ in relief (Transcarpathia is a mountain range, like Slovakia), ethnic composition and political traditions. These regions, which today actively influence the general political atmosphere of Ukraine, actively pursuing an anti-Moscow, pro-Western geopolitical line, should be granted a significant degree of autonomy (up to political) in order to tear these “subversive” territories from the Orthodox and generally pro-Russian allUkrainian space as a central one. and eastern. The strategic border of Russia on these parallels cannot depend on the location of the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Hungarian or Ukrainian-Slovak border. This strategic border should run much to the west, at least at the western tip of Central Europe, and at best across the Atlantic. It is from this perspective that the entire geopolitical restructuring of this region, since, acting as the initiator of geopolitical transformations in Eastern Europe and as the main partner of Germany, Russia should insist, first of all, on the condition of removing this entire region from under Atlanticist control and creating in this place a complex of the Eurasian continental defense, consisting of military-strategic cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole. Volyn, Galicia and Transcarpathia can form a common "Western Ukrainian federation", the degree of integration within which can be set arbitrarily, depending on specific circumstances. Here, the most important thing is to draw a cultural and confessional border between Central Ukraine (actually Kiev land) and Western Ukraine in order to avoid disharmonious Central European Catholic or Uniate influence on Orthodox territories.
The Ukrainian factor is the most vulnerable point in the western belt of Russia. If in other places the danger of destroying the geopolitical consistency of the heartland is potential, and the positional struggle for the Eurasian geopolitical system sets itself only preventive goals, the fact of the existence of a “sovereign Ukraine” at the geopolitical level is Russia's declaration of a geopolitical war (and this is not so much Ukraine itself, how much Atlanticism and Sea Power). The point is not that Ukraine itself deliberately chooses the role of the Atlanticist "cordon sanitaire", although in some cases this cannot but be a deliberate step, but that in practice it begins to fulfill this role, The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow.
If the problems of the North and the “polar trapezium” are connected with the distant future of Russia and Eurasia, if the development of Siberia and the battle for Lenaland are important for the near future, if, finally, the positional strategy of reorganizing the Asian South has an urgent but preventive value for Russia, the geopolitics of the West and the center of this geopolitics, the “Ukrainian question,” requires Moscow to immediately respond, since it is a question of delivering a strategic strike to Russia already in the present, to which the “geographical axis of history” simply has no right not to respond.
Considering that simple integration of Moscow with Kiev is impossible and will not provide a stable geopolitical system, even if this happens despite all objective obstacles, Moscow should be actively involved in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian space according to the only logical and natural geopolitical model.” Foundations of Geopolitics at 216 - 219, https://n01r.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Foundations-of-Geopolitics-Geopolitical-Future-of-Russia-Alexander-Dugin-English-auto-translation-with-appended-original.pdf