Facebook And Twitter Should Be Regulated As Common Carriers In Order To Preserve Freedom Of Speech In What Are Obviously Public Forums
And a good reason why Clarence Thomas should neither resign nor be impeached...
Justice Thomas writes, in a concurring opinion to BIDEN v. KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE, 593 US ____ (2021), the following:
”If part of the problem is private, concentrated control over online content and platforms available to the public, then part of the solution may be found in doctrines that limit the right of a private company to exclude. Historically, at least two legal doctrines limited a company's right to exclude.
First, our legal system and its British predecessor have long subjected certain businesses, known as common carriers, to special regulations, including a general requirement to serve all comers. Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage, Network Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 Yale J. L. & Tech. 391, 398-403 (2020) (Candeub); see also Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, Pt. 1, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 514 (1911). Justifications for these regulations have varied. Some scholars have argued that common-carrier regulations are justified only when a carrier possesses substantial market power. Candeub 404. Others have said that no substantial market power is needed so long as the company holds itself out as open to the public. Ibid.; see also Ingate v. Christie, 3 Car. & K. 61, 63, 175 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (N. P. 1850) ("[A] person [who] holds himself out to carry goods for everyone as a business . . . is a common carrier"). And this Court long ago suggested that regulations like those placed on common carriers may be justified, even for industries not historically recognized as common carriers, when "a business, by circumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s] from private to be of public concern." See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 411 (1914) (affirming state regulation of fire insurance rates). At that point, a company's "property is but its instrument, the means of rendering the service which has become of public interest." Id., at 408.
This latter definition of course is hardly helpful, for most things can be described as "of public interest." But whatever may be said of other industries, there is clear historical precedent for regulating transportation and communications networks in a similar manner as traditional common carriers. Candeub 398-405. Telegraphs, for example, because they "resemble[d] railroad companies and other common carriers," were "bound to serve all customers alike, without discrimination." Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).[2]
In exchange for regulating transportation and communication industries, governments—both State and Federal— have sometimes given common carriers special government favors. Candeub 402-407. For example, governments have tied restrictions on a carrier's ability to reject clients to "immunity from certain types of suits"[3] or to regulations that make it more difficult for other companies to compete with the carrier (such as franchise licenses). Ibid. By giving these companies special privileges, governments place them into a category distinct from other companies and closer to some functions, like the postal service, that the State has traditionally undertaken.
Second, governments have limited a company's right to exclude when that company is a public accommodation. This concept—related to common-carrier law—applies to companies that hold themselves out to the public but do not "carry" freight, passengers, or communications. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 41-43 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing places of public amusement). It also applies regardless of the company's market power. See, e.g., 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. §2000a(a).
B
Internet platforms of course have their own First Amendment interests, but regulations that might affect speech are valid if they would have been permissible at the time of the founding. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 (2010). The long history in this country and in England of restricting the exclusion right of common carriers and places of public accommodation may save similar regulations today from triggering heightened scrutiny—especially where a restriction would not prohibit the company from speaking or force the company to endorse the speech. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 684 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 88 (1980). There is a fair argument that some digital platforms are sufficiently akin to common carriers or places of accommodation to be regulated in this manner.
1
In many ways, digital platforms that hold themselves out to the public resemble traditional common carriers. Though digital instead of physical, they are at bottom communications networks, and they "carry" information from one user to another. A traditional telephone company laid physical wires to create a network connecting people. Digital platforms lay information infrastructure that can be controlled in much the same way. And unlike newspapers, digital platforms hold themselves out as organizations that focus on distributing the speech of the broader public. Federal law dictates that companies cannot "be treated as the publisher or speaker" of information that they merely distribute. 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. §230(c).
The analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital platforms that have dominant market share. Similar to utilities, today's dominant digital platforms derive much of their value from network size. The Internet, of course, is a network. But these digital platforms are networks within that network. The Facebook suite of apps is valuable largely because 3 billion people use it. Google search—at 90% of the market share—is valuable relative to other search engines because more people use it, creating data that Google's algorithm uses to refine and improve search results. These network effects entrench these companies. Ordinarily, the astronomical profit margins of these platforms—last year, Google brought in $182.5 billion total, $40.3 billion in net income—would induce new entrants into the market. That these companies have no comparable competitors highlights that the industries may have substantial barriers to entry.
To be sure, much activity on the Internet derives value from network effects. But dominant digital platforms are different. Unlike decentralized digital spheres, such as the e-mail protocol, control of these networks is highly concentrated. Although both companies are public, one person controls Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg), and just two control Google (Larry Page and Sergey Brin). No small group of people controls e-mail.
Much like with a communications utility, this concentration gives some digital platforms enormous control over speech. When a user does not already know exactly where to find something on the Internet—and users rarely do— Google is the gatekeeper between that user and the speech of others 90% of the time. It can suppress content by deindexing or downlisting a search result or by steering users away from certain content by manually altering autocomplete results. Grind, Schechner, McMillan, & West, How Google Interferes With Its Search Algorithms and Changes Your Results, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 2019. Facebook and Twitter can greatly narrow a person's information flow through similar means. And, as the distributor of the clear majority of e-books and about half of all physical books,[4] Amazon can impose cataclysmic consequences on authors by, among other things, blocking a listing.
It changes nothing that these platforms are not the sole means for distributing speech or information. A person always could choose to avoid the toll bridge or train and instead swim the Charles River or hike the Oregon Trail. But in assessing whether a company exercises substantial market power, what matters is whether the alternatives are comparable. For many of today's digital platforms, nothing is. …
The similarities between some digital platforms and common carriers or places of public accommodation may give legislators strong arguments for similarly regulating digital platforms. "[I]t stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of" digital platforms. Turner, 512 U. S., at 684 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). That is especially true because the space constraints on digital platforms are practically nonexistent (unlike on cable companies), so a regulation restricting a digital platform's right to exclude might not appreciably impede the platform from speaking. See id., at 675, 684 (noting restrictions on one-third of a cable company's channels but recognizing that regulation may still be justified); PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 88. Yet Congress does not appear to have passed these kinds of regulations. To the contrary, it has given digital platforms "immunity from certain types of suits," Candeub 403, with respect to content they distribute, 47 U. S. C. §230, but it has not imposed corresponding responsibilities, like nondiscrimination, that would matter here.
None of this analysis means, however, that the First Amendment is irrelevant until a legislature imposes common carrier or public accommodation restrictions—only that the principal means for regulating digital platforms is through those methods. Some speech doctrines might still apply in limited circumstances, as this Court has recognized in the past.
For example, although a "private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the First Amendment," Halleck, 587 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 6, 9), it is if the government coerces or induces it to take action the government itself would not be permitted to do, such as censor expression of a lawful viewpoint. Ibid. Consider government threats. "People do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come around." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 68 (1963). The government cannot accomplish through threats of adverse government action what the Constitution prohibits it from doing directly. See ibid.; Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1004-1005 (1982). Under this doctrine, plaintiffs might have colorable claims against a digital platform if it took adverse action against them in response to government threats.” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-197_5ie6.pdf
Dependence on the whims and occasional good graces of billionaires just allows them to make law, a power which they should not have, as in the following:
“But, seriously, what happened was, Free Speech Twitter “visibility filtered” Matt Walsh’s film, What is a Woman?, and Musk cultists’ brains were literally short-circuiting …
The poor Musk cultists could not believe that their beloved leader, a multi-billionaire military contractor and world-class huckster who wants to put computerized chips in their heads, had betrayed them. After all, he promised he wouldn’t! Or, I don’t know, maybe he didn’t …
In any event, it was pandemonium in the VIP Lounge at Musk Cult HQ. The wailing of assorted senior Musk Cultists resounded all across the Internet. “It can’t be Elon! No, not our Elon! Elon would never do this to us! This has to be the work of the secret evil cabal of culturally-Marxist censors who are sabotaging Elon’s dream of saving the Internet from the Bad Blue People! Yes, that’s it! It was Ella Irwin and her cocaine-addled Commonist Twitter moles!” (In case it wasn’t already obvious, that “Ella Irwin” tweet above is a fake.)
For a moment there, I was getting a little worried that we were looking at another Jonestown-type deal. But then, of course, right on cue, Elon swooped in and saved “free speech” from the evil Commie Wokesters, again!
Who could have possibly predicted that?!”
Billionaires who invariably build monopolies usually by corruption of state power act only in their perceived self interest, which may or may not coincide with the public interest, but if they did not consistently act in their own self interest, they would not be billionaires. Their motives must be under constant suspicion, and the corporations and monopolies controlled by them must either be broken up to destroy their absolute control, or they must be regulated to act in the interest of preservation of the public liberties as set out in the Bill of Rights, or both.
Some history of particular relevance of which note should be taken:
”When American colonists declared independence from England in 1776, they also freed themselves from control by English corporations that extracted their wealth and dominated trade. After fighting a revolution to end this exploitation, our country’s founders retained a healthy fear of corporate power and wisely limited corporations exclusively to a business role. Corporations were forbidden from attempting to influence elections, public policy, and other realms of civic society.
Initially, the privilege of incorporation was granted selectively to enable activities that benefited the public, such as construction of roads or canals. Enabling shareholders to profit was seen as a means to that end. The states also imposed conditions (some of which remain on the books, though unused) like these*:
Corporate charters (licenses to exist) were granted for a limited time and could be revoked promptly for violating laws.
Corporations could engage only in activities necessary to fulfill their chartered purpose.
Corporations could not own stock in other corporations nor own any property that was not essential to fulfilling their chartered purpose.
Corporations were often terminated if they exceeded their authority or caused public harm.
Owners and managers were responsible for criminal acts committed on the job.
Corporations could not make any political or charitable contributions nor spend money to influence law-making.
For 100 years after the American Revolution, legislators maintained tight control of the corporate chartering process. Because of widespread public opposition, early legislators granted very few corporate charters, and only after debate. Citizens governed corporations by detailing operating conditions not just in charters but also in state constitutions and state laws. Incorporated businesses were prohibited from taking any action that legislators did not specifically allow.
States also limited corporate charters to a set number of years. Unless a legislature renewed an expiring charter, the corporation was dissolved and its assets were divided among shareholders. Citizen authority clauses limited capitalization, debts, land holdings, and sometimes, even profits. They required a company’s accounting books to be turned over to a legislature upon request. The power of large shareholders was limited by scaled voting, so that large and small investors had equal voting rights. Interlocking directorates were outlawed. Shareholders had the right to remove directors at will.
In Europe, charters protected directors and stockholders from liability for debts and harms caused by their corporations. American legislators explicitly rejected this corporate shield. The penalty for abuse or misuse of the charter was not a plea bargain and a fine, but dissolution of the corporation.
In 1819 the U.S. Supreme Court tried to strip states of this sovereign right by overruling a lower court’s decision that allowed New Hampshire to revoke a charter granted to Dartmouth College by King George III. The Court claimed that since the charter contained no revocation clause, it could not be withdrawn. The Supreme Court’s attack on state sovereignty outraged citizens. Laws were written or re-written and new state constitutional amendments passed to circumvent the (Dartmouth College v Woodward) ruling. Over several decades starting in 1844, nineteen states amended their constitutions to make corporate charters subject to alteration or revocation by their legislatures. As late as 1855, it seemed that the Supreme Court had gotten the peoples’ message when in Dodge v. Woolsey it reaffirmed states’ powers over “artificial bodies.” https://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate-accountability-history-corporations-us/
We would be well served by a reversion to this status quo ante…